When Cleveland Police Officer Michael Brelo mounted the hood
of a Chevy Malibu and fired fifteen shots through the windshield, killing
Timothy Russell and Melissa Williams, he behaved in an “unreasonable” and
“unconstitutional” fashion. This was the testimony offered by W. Ken Katsaris, a
nationally renowned expert witness on use-of-force issues, during
Brelo’s bench trial for two counts of voluntary manslaughter.
Brelo’s actions amounted to the execution-style murder of a
terrified, unarmed couple whose vehicle had been immobilized following a 22-minute
high-speed pursuit and a
137-round onslaught by police. This isn’t why Katsaris found Brelo’s
behavior to be “unreasonable” or “unconstitutional.”
The lives of the victims were not consequential in
Katsaris’s constitutional calculations: Once the decision had been made to kill
the Mundanes, the only relevant consideration was the safety of Officer Breloand his comrades on the scene.
By leaping on top of the hood of the car, Brelo was “taking
action that is not trained, not recognized, not safe, and put all of the other
officers in the vicinity of his becoming a victim and their [the other
officers] having to attempt to now engage to save his life,” Katsaris testified
before trial judge John P. O’Donnell.
If an officer is in fear for his life and behind cover,
which was Brelo’s posture until the last eight seconds of the engagement, it
would make not a particle of sense for that officer to abandon cover and “put
[himself] standing on top of a car in the middle of, as he called it, a fire
fight,” Katsaris explained.
The logical inference to be drawn from that act is that the
targeted individuals did not actually pose a threat, and that Brelo’s actions
would have to be regarded as murder. Katsaris disposes of that possibility by
insisting that the officer’s “subjective belief” didn’t matter, because he and
the other cops have legally protected discretion to kill even when the
circumstances do not justify that action. The only “objective” consideration is
the safety of the officers as they exercise their lethal discretion.
“You don’t put yourself in a position of officer down in the
middle of a situation [like] that he was involved in,” insisted Katsaris.
“That’s why it’s objectively unreasonable…. It’s taking yourself out from
behind cover. And you’re putting yourself in crossfire. And you’ are putting
the other officers in jeopardy of having to now, if you get shot, save your
life which risks their lives.”
When he was asked if Brelo would have acted “reasonably” and
“constitutionally” by remaining behind cover while firing the final fifteen shots,
Katsaris replied: “I would probably say so.”
Killing Russell and Williams efficiently and with minimal
risk to the government-certified assailants was “objectively reasonable,” by
Katsaris’s analysis. This is because only the “Blue Lives” on the scene truly
mattered. Divested of double-talk and purged of persiflage, Judge O’Donnell’s
ruling acquitting Brelo of voluntary manslaughter expresses the same view.
“If defendant Michael Brelo is not guilty … if the evidence
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly caused [the victims’]
deaths in violation of the Constitution – then I will not sacrifice him to a
public frustrated by historical mistreatment at the hands of other officers,” wrote
O’Donnell in a lengthy and self-indulgent prelude to the inevitable
exoneration. “At the same time, if the evidence did prove the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt then he will be found guilty and punished as [would]
any other criminal. His badge and gun offer no special protection here. He and
I took similar oaths to support and uphold the Constitution. If the evidence
shows that he violated his he can be sure I will honor mine.”
Thirteen pages later, Judge O’Donnell ruled that “as a
matter of law … Brelo, shooting from the Malibu’s hood, acted in a sudden
passion or a sudden fit of rage in response to serious provocation by Timothy
Russell and Melissa Williams sufficient to incite Brelo to use deadly force” –
one of the key elements of the charge against him. Four pages further in, the
judge ruled that it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Brelo
“caused at least one” of the gunshot wounds that caused Russell’s death.”
For any defendant not accoutered with a badge and accustomed to carrying a government-issued gun, those findings of fact would translate into a guilty verdict. The “equal protection” provisions of the U.S. Constitution – assuming that they retain any meaning – would dictate the same outcome for a police officer.
For any defendant not accoutered with a badge and accustomed to carrying a government-issued gun, those findings of fact would translate into a guilty verdict. The “equal protection” provisions of the U.S. Constitution – assuming that they retain any meaning – would dictate the same outcome for a police officer.
The “constitution” to which both O’Donnell and Brelo swore
an oath, however, is not the written document with which many Americans are
familiar. It is an unwritten set of customs and assumptions growing out of the
concept of “qualified immunity” for those who carry out the State’s errand of
lethal force. In the words of an
amicus brief filed in the most
recent US Supreme Court case involving the question, “police officers, in
addition to receiving qualified immunity, are entitled to wide discretion in
making an arrest….Deference is a key part of the Court’s immunity
jurisprudence…. By allowing some margin of error, the Court avoids a chilling
effect on law enforcement.”
The operative assumption, derived from the
1974 Supreme Court opinion in Scheuer v. Rhodes, is that “it is better to risk
some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.”
That ruling, a bellwether case involving “qualified immunity,” was issued in
response to a lawsuit filed on behalf of victims and survivors of the Kent
State Massacre.
Once a police officer has decided on a “taking” – whether a
traffic stop, investigative detention, an arrest, or a killing – the matter has
been settled, and the subject has no choice but to submit. If this results in
an innocent Mundane suffering injury or death, this is a regrettable “error,”
but the officer cannot be held responsible; doing so would inhibit his comrades
in similar situations, thereby putting their incomparably valuable lives at
unacceptable risk.
Katsaris has diligently propagated that view as a trainer
and expert witness on behalf of Americans For Efficiency in Law Enforcement
(AELE). It may not be surprising to some that Katsaris found it “objectively
reasonable” for adrenaline-propelled police officers to kill two unarmed people
at the end of a long and dangerous car chase. Hopefully most people would be
taken aback to learn that he conferred the same benediction upon the actions of
a Portland Police Officer who fatally shot an unarmed, emotionally distraught
man in the back as he was running away.
Distraught after his brother died from heart and kidney
failure, 25-year-old
Aaron Campbell suffered a breakdown while visiting his girlfriend. Portland
Police received a call about a “suicidal man with a gun.” Very shortly
thereafter several police officers materialized on the scene and, in keeping
with the prevailing standards of conduct within their profession, resolved the
situation by murdering the suicidal man.
Standing at a substantial distance from the police, Campbell had
his back to the officers and his hands in the air when one officer fired
several beanbag rounds at him. Another unleashed a police dog. Those actions
were taken, according to the officers, because Campbell “wasn’t following
commands.” Understandably fearful for his own safety, Campbell started to run –
only to be brought down by a single shot fired into his back from an AR-15 wielded
by Officer Ronald Frashour.
A
grand jury declined to indict Frashour, insisting that the fatal
back-shooting of the unarmed and terrified man “was … consistent with the
relevant laws and statutes regarding the use of deadly force by a police
officer.” Their perceptions of that issue were sculpted, in large measure, by the
“expert” testimony of Katsaris during his December 29, 2011 deposition.
“Officer Frashour comported with the training that was
offered in terms of the reasonableness of his decision and what it was based
on,” Katsaris insisted. “And I concluded that it was reasonable, and
objectively [sic], because it is an objective rather than a subjective
analysis.”
Then-sheriff Katsaris with unlicensed killer Ted Bundy. |
Katsaris’s performance was a rote recital of the familiar
conjurations used to justify police homicide. In one particularly substance-free
portion of his testimony, Katsaris insisted that Frashour’s act of homicide was
justifiable because of “the perceptions of that officer at that time, in the
shoes of that officer, given the totality of circumstances that are presented
to him at the moment that he makes that decision.”
He was “part of the plan but
not the planner,” the witness concluded, recasting the familiar Nuremberg
Defense in the contemporary language of corporate management. At this point it should be clear
that the words spoken by "experts" like Katsaris don't matter; they
engage in a kind of performance art in which their very presence
signifies the correctness of the officer's decision to kill somebody. Of passing interest is the fact that Katsaris first earned notoriety three decades ago as Sheriff of Leon County, Florida: Following the arrest of Ted Bundy, then-Sheriff Katsaris was the officer who read the indictment to the serial killer. Since that time, Katsaris has devoted his energy to the defense of Bundy's killing fraternity who commit those acts while garbed in the robes of the state's punitive priesthood.
After he joined that fraternity by killing Aaron Campbell in 2010, Ronald Frashour was fired, then suspended
for two years during the official inquiry, then
reinstated with full back pay. As a result, Ronald
Frashour was the fourth-highest-paid Portland employee in 2012.
While Frashour’s life was never in jeopardy, the
police union insisted that his livelihood was of greater value than the
innocent life he had ended. As police union spokesman William James Manifold
candidly explains, "All lives don't matter” – and “Blue Lives” matter
immeasurably more than those of the public supposedly protected by the police.
Although "all lives have the potential to matter,"
Manifold
explained in an essay republished by the Colorado Lodge of the Fraternal Order
of Police, "most certainly all lives don't matter." For him, and
other active and retired members of the Sanctified Fraternity of State-Licensed
Violence, it is an unassailable truth that "Blue Lives Matter," and
that mere Mundanes should literally prostrate themselves in worship before
their costumed overseers:
"[B]y whatever God you worship or don't, by all things
holy, #BlueLivesMatter.... Instead of you getting on some high horse thinking
that you are being so damned enlightened with you `All Lives Matter' bullsh*t,
you should be getting on your knees thanking each and every one of those people
who gave their live [sic] so you can sleep at night, so you can walk the
street, so you can enjoy the safety that they provide."
"If I've offended you, I honestly don't give a sh*t,"
continues Manifold, giving unvarnished expression to the institutional attitude of
law enforcement as a profession. "And honestly, if you get offended that
easily and don't or won't support our law enforcement officers then I really
don't have the time for you so good riddance. You are part of the
problem."
Those who carry out the State's errand of violence
"matter," but this is only selectively true of lesser beings who
supposedly "enjoy the blanket of protection" provided by the State
and its enforcement caste. If you "show your support ... turn on a blue
light at night, thank an officer, attend a Citizens Police Academy," or otherwise
express the expected attitude of chastened gratitude and awe-struck reverence
before the Praetorians, "you matter." Those who "choose to walk
on the `other side' of the line, well just keep walking, they'll get to you
eventually.... You don't matter."
The "other side," on this construction, includes
not only criminals but critics of the police. These are lives that "don't
matter," or lebensunwerten
leben, as the same concept was expressed in Germany eight decades ago.
Manifold, interestingly, has been photographed wearing a
baseball cap decorated with the “1*” symbol. The purpose of that decal, as was
explained to me by someone better-versed in the semiotics of police privilege,
is to
remind police officers that each of them has “one ass to risk” – and that
protecting it at all times, and in all circumstances, is their first priority.
This is because -- as Katsaris and Manifold explained, and
police conduct reminds us every day – only “Blue Lives” really matter.
Dum spiro, pugno!
Dum spiro, pugno!