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| Guatemala City, August 8, 1983: Troops Seize the Presidential Palace |
“Is today a patriotic holiday of some kind?”
My inquiry had been provoked by the abundance of armed soldiers being ferried through the streets of Guatemala City. My friend, a native Guatemalteco, shook his head, a puzzled frown creasing his features.
“Then why are there so many troops on the streets?” I persisted, directing his attention to the grim-faced, uniformed figures visible beyond the windows of our “Chicken Bus.” It was Monday morning, August 8, 1983, and the two of us were taking a break from our missionary labors to shop for necessities downtown. The concentration of military personnel – and the visible agitation of my native-born friend -- increased as we approached the City Center.
About an hour later, we were intercepted by another missionary while returning to the bus stop.
“The government was overthrown in a coup this morning,” he
informed us in a voice drawn taut with urgency. “We're supposed to go back to
our apartments, lock the doors, and wait until we're told it's safe to come
out.”
Shocked but not entirely surprised, I turned to a third missionary who had joined us in our shopping excursion, a young man from Blackfoot, Idaho, whose reaction to the news was more surprising that the coup itself.
Shocked but not entirely surprised, I turned to a third missionary who had joined us in our shopping excursion, a young man from Blackfoot, Idaho, whose reaction to the news was more surprising that the coup itself.
“Cool!” he yelped,
pumping a fist in the air.
Like any other 20-year-old male, I was a shameless adrenaline junkie, but my
response was rather more subdued. After returning to our apartment in the suburbs, we turned on the radio and television, both of which were playing a continuous program of music interrupted each hour by a brief speech from Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, the figurehead of the officers' putsch that ousted President Efrain Rios-Montt, an erratic general who had been in power for about a year and a half following a previous coup.

Several weeks earlier, Rios-Montt had declared a state of emergency, accusing the military and the media of plotting against him.
“They are using methods of manipulation to
provoke the public against me,” he raved in a televised speech that was
broadcast repeatedly in the weeks leading up to the coup, “but I'm still here.”
Rios-Montt had a mock-Evangelical speaking style that
was long on dramatic poses and pauses, longer still on frantic verbal effusions,
and all but devoid of substance. Some Guatemalans took to calling him “El
Pajaro Loco” -- “Crazy Bird,” the local name for the cartoon character Woody Woodpecker. In retrospect he more
closely resembled a well-groomed version of El Guapo, the Bandit Chieftain from Three Amigos.
Rios-Montt's abhorrence for Communism was genuine, and nearly as passionate as
his contempt for individual liberty. His message to Guatemala’s rural peasantry
was simple: “If you are with us, we'll feed you; if you're not, we'll kill
you.”
By all accounts, Rios-Montt displayed Caligulan capriciousness in
defining who was “with” or “against” him, and his zeal to kill those perceived
as enemies of the state was limitless. He presided over the most sanguinary
years of Guatemala’s decades-long civil war, a
period in which the army routinely slaughtered entire villages of Maya Indians.
The CIA giveth, and the CIA taketh away, so when Rios-Montt
became a liability to his patron he was quietly removed from office. The
military faction that collaborated in the coup did so because they were fixated
on efficiency, not freedom. The military seized control over the country out of
concern that Rios-Montt had mishandled the counter-insurgency campaign.
For two days following the August 1983 coup, we were
confined to our apartments with little more to do than read and listen to military
helicopters churning overhead. Eventually we were given the all-clear, but like
everybody else in the country we went about our business with a greatly enhanced
sense of wariness.
Once the generals were in undisguised control the violence
abated somewhat – although Guatemaltecos found it disconcerting to see dead
bodies occasionally materialize on the streets without warning.
A few weeks after the coup, I was transferred to a small town called La Democracia,
which was soon selected to host a counter-insurgency command post. Without
notice or explanation the army descended on the town, setting up checkpoints
and appropriating a large building as its operations center. Within a few weeks
the army had extended its operations into the nearby town of Siquinala, where I would
eventually have the stimulating experience of being threatened by a soldier who
pointed a U.S.-purchased M16 at my chest.
Memories of my time living under undisguised martial law
were summoned by the recent spectacle in Livingston,
Illinois, where a
military raid was conducted to arrest a solitary man suspected of possessing
child pornography. Agents from the Department of Homeland Security, backed
by SWAT teams, a Blackhawk helicopter, and officers from several local
jurisdictions converged on the home of 34-year-old Robert Godsey, who offered
no resistance as he was arrested and his computers were seized.
Without permission or explanation, the raiders set up a “staging
area” on the grounds of the A.R. Graiff Elementary School, displaying the same
arrogant indifference to the locals that had radiated from the Guatemalan Army
as it seized control of streets and buildings in La Democracia and Siquinala.
“It’s better to be over-prepared,” smirked Jim Porter of the
US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Illinois in response to
questions about wildly disproportionate use of force. Dutifully regurgitating
pre-digested soundbites Porter insisted that the most important consideration for
the raiders is to be prepared for what they “reasonably expect might happen.”
And since their indoctrination describes the public as an undifferentiated mass
of menace, and their role as subduing any potential resistance, rather than
protecting property rights, their default setting is “overkill.”
This obsession with “force protection” – or, as it is
commonly called, “officer safety” – is the primary driver behind the
124 SWAT raids that occur, on average, every day in the United States. These
are not “paramilitary” raids; they are fully realized military operations
carried out with financial support from Washington and material assistance from
the Pentagon. The only significant difference between counter-insurgency
operations overseas and the ones conducted domestically is the fact that
military personnel operate under more restrictive rules of engagement than
police officers.
The SWAT concept itself could be considered a domestic variant of
the “Counter-terror teams” assembled by the CIA as part of the murderous “Phoenix
Program” in Vietnam. Amid mounting – and overdue, but welcome -- public
antipathy toward police militarization, the Homeland Security apparatus has
ramped up its longstanding campaign to collect
information on activists and commentators who promote “anti-police” attitudes
– another homefront adaptation of counter-insurgency methods.
In 2008, total
government spending on “police protection” was $76 billion – nearly half of
all “criminal justice”-related expenditures. In the following year the
Obama administration poured additional billions of dollars into the Justice
Department’s Byrne Memorial Grant program. That program is one of the chief
federal funding arteries for “local” police departments – and perhaps the most
significant tool the Feds have employed to mobilize police departments and
sheriff’s offices in the “war on drugs.”
The foregoing happened before
the most recent push to provide every police agency with surplus war-fighting
vehicles – even
if their officers patrol tiny rural villages in which crime is all but
nonexistent. Of course, the same was true of La Democracia and Siquinala
before the Guatemala army showed up to “pacify” them.
Unlike Guatemala, the United States has not witnessed an
overt military coup, yet our society is more pervasively militarized than that
country was when I lived there decades ago, at the nadir of a long and brutal
civil war. The welcome news is that our rulers haven’t rolled up a comparable
body count. The ominous news is that they’re just getting started.
Dum spiro, pugno!














