Support Your Local Private Peace Officer: He Has A Dangerous Job

Peace Officer Down: The aftermath of the fatal shooting of Alvin Kinney in Houston.

At the end of every shift, police officers call their loved ones to assure them that they “made it through another day without injury,” observes a recently published paean to the police. “From 2000 until 2014, over 700 officers were unable to make that call because they did not survive their tour of duty on that last day.”

Alvin Kinney didn’t make it home at the end of his shift on February 12. The 60-year-old officer, who had served in a very dangerous job for more than 20 years, was fatally shot trying to prevent an armed robbery in Houston. His death was mourned by his family and loved ones but did not precipitate an outpouring of officially mandated grief. This is because
Mr. Kinney was not a member of the State’s enforcement caste. He was a private peace officer employed by the Brinks armored truck company, where he faced far greater risks defending private property than are confronted by government-employed police who enforce the edicts of the political class.

While law enforcement is statistically much safer than depicted by police unions and related pressure groups, police officers are sometimes killed or severely injured in the line of duty, and occasionally some of them do so in genuinely heroic defense of innocent people threatened by criminal violence. The same is true of private peace officers who provide security services through market mechanisms, rather than a state-imposed monopoly. 

Fallen hero: Alvin Kinney.

During the same fifteen-year-period in which roughly 700 police officers weren’t able to make the end-of-shift phone call, at least 1863 private security officers were killed while carrying out a contractual commitment to protect others against criminal violence. 

Rick McCann, founder and CEO of Matthews, North Carolina-based Private Officer International (POI), explains that the toll might be considerably higher: Prior to the founding of his organization about a decade ago, nobody bothered keeping track of on-duty deaths of private peace officers.

“What we found in the first year is that the Department of Labor wasn’t listing those incidents as on-duty deaths of security officers, but was including them as workplace fatalities involving `laborers,’” McCann commented in a telephone interview. “Many employers don’t describe them as `on-duty’ deaths, or report how they occurred. They’re simply reported as `employee deaths.’ And media coverage of those incidents tends to be inconsistent. For example, we’ll often find a report of an incident in which a security guard is wounded, but have to do our own follow-up to find out if he survived.” 

Every police department keeps careful records of on-duty deaths, each of which is prominently reported in the media and included in the FBI’s annual report. Thus far, McCann’s organization is the only one seeking to compile a definitive record of on-duty deaths of private security personnel, chiefly by data-mining media coverage and collecting first-hand accounts from people in the security industry. Their research, which – for whatever this may be worth -- is considered authoritative by the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, indicates that violent on-duty deaths involving private security personnel happen much more frequently than similar incidents involving government law enforcement officers. 

On May 11, as part of “National Law Enforcement Week,” the FBI released its preliminary findings regarding line-of-duty deaths by police officers in 2015. Headlines generated by the report focused on the fact that “felonious killings” of police officers increased by nearly 89 percent from 2013-2014. Less attention was given to the fact that 27 police officers died violently in 2013 – the lowest figure in 35 years. Last year’s figure -- 51 violent line-of-duty deaths – is slightly higher than the number killed in accidents (44). Interestingly, last year more police officers died in automobile accidents (28) than were feloniously killed during the previous year.   According to POI, so far this year there have been 21 confirmed on-duty deaths of private security officers.

“It’s true that an on-duty police officer dies, on average, every 53 hours in this country,” allows McCann, who retains his certification as a law enforcement officer in Virginia and North Carolina. “Most of those deaths happen as a result of traffic accidents, or issues arising from training and physical conditioning” – such as self-inflicted injuries, heart attacks, or strokes. In the private security field, by way of contrast, more than eighty percent of the on-duty fatalities are “a result of traumatic, confrontational injury” inflicted by someone committing an act of criminal violence. 

Not all of those on-the-job deaths came about in circumstances calling to mind Horatius at the bridge. Some of them did, however—and yet few, if any, of these privately employed peace officers, whose sole mission is to protect persons and property, rather than to enforce the will of the political class, was publicly commended for acting in defense of the innocent.

Those deaths were not treated as occasions of public mourning, or marked with pious editorials demanding that we prostrate ourselves in reverent grief over the sacrifice of a hero, even though few things are more genuinely heroic or honorable than keeping a solemn promise to defend another person, even at the risk of one’s life. 

Police officers occasionally act in protection of persons and property, despite the fact that they have no enforceable duty to provide that service. This is true even when they see an innocent man being hacked to death by a knife-wielding psychopath a few feet away -- as Joseph Lozito discovered when he was nearly killed while subduing a murderer on a New York subway while an armed NYPD officer cowered behind a partition.

Wounded while subduing a murderer: Joseph Lozito.

Private security personnel, and the organizations that employ them, have no purpose other than providing that protection on behalf of paying customers. Police departments, on the other hand, exist to serve the interests of those who extract taxes, rather than those forced to surrender them. 

This role is vividly demonstrated whenever riots coalesce. As mobs loot and burn private property, grim-faced, armor-clad police form phalanxes to protect their own headquarters, City Hall, and other outposts of the tax-devouring class.

Beginning in New York City more than three decades ago, many urban police agencies adopted the “Broken Windows” theory of law enforcement. This approach emphasizes aggressive enforcement of “quality of life” ordinances – such as the cigarette taxes that provided a rationale for the fatal arrest of Eric Garner -- as a way of establishing “order” and deterring violent crime. 

“Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken,” asserted James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in their seminal March 1982 essay on the subject. “Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who would probably consider themselves law-abiding.” On that same principle, the authors continued, “`untended’ behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls.”

Most public officials who invoke (and, to some extent, misrepresent) the “Broken Windows” concept seek to beguile the public into believing that liberty is the product of order, when the reverse is true: Order exists where property rights are secure. Wilson and Kelling admit that this objective is best pursued by applying “the standards of the neighborhood” – that is, the informal consensus among peaceful property owners -- rather than “the rules of the state” – the pronouncements of people who claim a monopoly on aggressive force.
When dealing with “disorderly” elements, Wilson and Kelling continue, “citizen action without substantial police involvement” is not only practical, but preferable.

“Until well into the nineteenth century, volunteer watchmen, not policemen, patrolled their communities to keep order,” explain the authors. “They did so, by and large, without taking the law into their hands – without, that is, punishing persons or using force. Their presence deterred disorder or alerted the community to disorder that could not be deterred.” 

In what we are all but required by law to call the “Post-9/11 Era,” law enforcement, acting for the supposed purpose of maintaining order,  has become unabashedly militarized and conspicuous to the point of ubiquity. The totems of regimentation and state “authority” are, to invoke Bastiat’s dichotomy, what can be seen. However, civilized order, meaning the protection of property, is actually maintained through the all but unseen efforts of private security officers. They play that dangerous role unprotected by institutional privileges, and fully encumbered with personal liability for negligent or criminal acts.

Dale Brown of Detroit's very successful Threat Management Center.

To offer one small but significant illustration: Last year, according to “loss prevention” data compiled by the Florida-based Hayes International security firm, there were more than two million incidents in which private security officers intervened to prevent theft. McCann estimates that this led to the recovery of more than $1 billion in property. 

As is the case in any other industry, there are some unreliable and irresponsible people in the private security field. Many security operatives who meet that description are off-duty police officers who can’t overcome the privileged mindset that comes with a state-granted license to commit aggressive violence.  

McCann points out that there is a growing tendency for private security organizations to assume a “law enforcement role,” a trend that should be reversed immediately. While specialists who investigate crimes against property and apprehend people suspected of committing them will always be needed, law enforcement – as distinct from protection of property rights – is a practice that is unsuited to a free society. Rather than encouraging private peace officers to mimic the behavior of cops, we should demand that government-employed police – to the extent we countenance their continued existence – behave like their betters in the private sector. 

When private security operatives fail to perform their contracted services, the market will punish them and reward their competitors. When they commit an act of criminal violence, they can’t take refuge in “qualified immunity,” invoke their “Garrity” privileges, or wrap themselves in a special, union-composed, occupation-specific “bill of rights.” They’re liable to prosecution on the same terms as any other citizen. The companies that employ corrupt or abusive security operatives can’t deflect inquiries into their conduct by describing the question as a “personnel matter,” then carrying out an internal investigation designed to exonerate the officers. 

Private security agencies cannot claim or exercise the ability to retaliate against their critics. They can’t force the public at large to pay for their services, or impose fines, imprisonment, or physical injury on those who want to un-subscribe from them. They cannot detain or abuse people on the basis of suspicion. They can't inflict summary punishment for "contempt of cop."

To provide the service for which they are paid, private security personnel must put their client’s interests ahead of their own safety, and avoid violating the rights of the innocent. And when they fail, they go out of business. Government law enforcement agencies, by way of contrast, aren't subject to market discipline. Those who preside over them react to failure by demanding more money, power, and privileges until they bankrupt the municipal corporation that employs them.


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"This is America": The Day Police Firebombed West Philadelphia

"Let it burn": Osage Avenue, Philadelphia, May 13, 1985

By the time Lt. Frank Powell hurled a satchel bomb onto the roof of a three-story row house on Philadelphia’s Osage Avenue, the siege had gone on for nearly twelve hours. Powell was a member of the Philadelphia PD’s bomb squad, and like the “firemen” in Ray Bradbury’s dystopian novelette, he was performing a function assumed to be the opposite of his expected role: Rather than disposing of a military-grade bomb, he was using it as a weapon of mass destruction.

The building targeted by Powell was occupied by members of a militant group called The MOVE.  Aerial photographs taken shortly before the May 13, 1985 assault displayed a weapons bunker and large containers of oil on the roof of the row house. So it wasn’t at all surprising that a few seconds after Powell heaved his bomb from the open door of a State Police helicopter, a huge orange fireball erupted from the top of the building. The uncontained fire consumed that house and sixty others, leaving the entire neighborhood a smoldering ruin. 

 

Aerial assault: Lt. Powell hurls the satchel bomb.

Philadelphia was the only U.S. city to be bombed from the air during the Cold War, and the perpetrator of that attack was not the Soviet Union, the Weather Underground, or some other offshoot of the Soviet-inspired “Tricontinental Movement.” The perpetrators of this act of mass terrorism was the Philadelphia PD – with the indispensable help of the FBI and the US military. 

Democratic Representative Bob Brady, who at the time of the siege was a deputy mayor, recalls seeing “All these military men giving advice” during a planning session in Mayor Wilson Goode’s office. “I thought it would be a good idea if we got a boom crane to knock that bunker off,” he recounted. “But somebody above my pay scale decided against it.”

That official was City Managing Director Leo Brooks, a retired brigadier general who approved of the plan  and observed the bombing from the ninth floor balcony of a nearby geriatric center. Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor, another retired military officer who, according to the son of long-time Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo, “ran around in fatigues,” later testified that bombing the house “was selected as a conservative and safe approach to what I perceived as a tactical necessity.” If the bomb hadn’t been dropped from a helicopter, Sambor insisted, “the perception of that action would have been quite different.”

The fire rises: Detonation of the FBI-provided bomb.

The only mistake the police made in fire-bombing that residence, apparently, was to get the “opticals” wrong. This decision was not a matter of hasty, desperate improvisation, but rather of careful planning and premeditation.  

Prior to the May 13 assault, and without a formal request by the city’s “civilian” government, Special Agent Michael Macys of the Philadelphia FBI office provided the police bomb squad with 30 blocks of C-4 explosive and several sticks of Tovex. The latter is the same high-yield explosive provided to Timothy McVeigh by an FBI asset in order to build the Oklahoma City bomb almost exactly ten years later. 

Reasonable people would be justified in the suspicion that use of the satchel bomb was the preferred option, rather than a fallback plan. 

At the time of the detonation, Ramona Africa, a former paralegal who had become one of the most prominent and forceful representatives of MOVE, was hiding in the basement along with several children. They had sought refuge there after the police onslaught began, as Lt. Powell and his Bomb Squad comrades used small charges to blow holes in the wall in order to inject tear gas into the dwelling. 

“Attention, MOVE – this is America,” declared Police Commissioner Sambor by way of a loudspeaker as the attack began. “You have to abide by the laws and rules of America.”

“We was in the cellar for a while … and tear gas started coming in and we got the blankets,” recalled survivor Michael Moses Ward (who at the time of the events was known as Birdie Africa). “And we put them over our heads and started laying down.” That strategy proved useless after the bomb went off, creating a fire that burned at an estimated 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Police and fire department officials later claimed that the original plan was to use tear gas and “deluge guns” – high-volume fire hoses – to force the occupants out of the abandoned house pursuant to an eviction order and several arrest warrants on a variety of misdemeanor charges. Shortly after the first phase of the operation began, the sound of gunfire caused firefighters to scatter. 

Within the next ninety minutes, roughly 500 police officers would fire more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition into the dwelling.  Another fusillade was unleashed after the bomb went off and people attempted to flee from the burning building.

“Come out, come out,” whispered WCAU-TV photographer Peter Kane, horror-struck as he watched the fire from a nearby house he had staked out the previous evening. He wasn’t aware that a “tactical” order had been issued to “let the bunker burn.” Nor was he aware that police officers – some of them wielding machine guns, others armed with silenced sniper rifles – had opened fire on MOVE members trying to escape the flames. 

Police officials claimed the use of overwhelming force was necessary because the MOVE possessed a vast “arsenal” that included automatic weapons. A search of the rubble turned up a total of four firearms, none of which was a machine gun. 

During a subsequent investigative hearing, Officer William Stewart reported that he heard “automatic weapons fire” as MOVE members tried to escape the holocaust. When asked who was pulling the triggers, Stewart replied: “Police officers. All the stakeout officers were running into the alley. They all had Uzi machine guns.” This account was corroborated by Officer James D’Ulisse of the Philadelphia PD, and John Vaccarelli and Joseph Murray of the City Fire Department. 

Eleven people were killed as a result of the bombing. Six of them – including five children -- were cut down by gunfire as they fled the burning building. 

During a press conference held the evening of the fire, Mayor Goode said he was “fully accountable” for what had happened that day, pointedly exonerating his subordinates. Ten months later a special investigative commission described the bombing as “unconscionable.”

Mayor Goode was elected to a second term. None of the police officials involved in the atrocity was charged with a crime or subjected to administrative discipline. Four years after the bombing, FBI Special Agent Macys was suspended for thirty days – not for the unauthorized and illegal transfer of explosives, but for his “evaluation of the FBI’s liability” in the matter, according to contemporaneous press accounts. 

The only person who endured punishment of any kind in this affair was Ramona Africa, who was convicted of “riot” and “conspiracy.” She spent seven years in prison convalescing from the burns she endured while rescuing Birdie Africa, the only child to survive the firebombing. Following her release, Ramona received a $500,000 civil judgment from the city – after every officer and policy-maker involved in the bombing had been granted “qualified immunity” against personal liability. 

Rather than treating the incident as a tragic mistake or an act of criminal negligence, the FBI apparently used it to beta-test tactics later employed against “extremists” of different varieties. 

During the August 1992 siege at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, eyewitnesses and a TV camera crew saw an FBI helicopter take off carrying a large incendiary bomb that would have annihilated the Weaver family’s pathetic dwelling and cremated the troublesome people residing therein.

The April 19, 1993 assault by the FBI and Delta Force against the Branch Davidians involved  tactics quite similar to those that had been employed against the MOVE, and ended with paramilitary operators directing automatic weapons fire into the flames to deter, or kill, anyone seeking to escape. 

As was the case at Ruby Ridge and Waco, the group targeted on Osage Avenue consisted of socially marginal people who espoused peculiar religious views. Unlike the Weavers or the Branch Davidians, the MOVE lived in the middle of an urban neighborhood and had managed to alienate everyone living nearby. 

Founded by a grade school dropout named Vincent Leapheart who renamed himself John Africa, the MOVE combined a primitivist ideology akin to that of Earth First! with the public relations sensibility of the Westboro Baptist Church. Calling the group a cult is descriptive, rather than pejorative: Its members severed ties with the outside world, changed their surnames to “Africa,” and subscribed to a totalistic worldview in which John Africa was seen as a Christ figure. The MOVE’s doctrinaire aversion to hygiene and its insistence on sharing living quarters with animals turned the home they occupied into a reeking, decaying sty.

Seen as “revolutionaries” and “terrorists” by the city government, the MOVE experienced countless run-ins with the police. One of them led to a violent arrest in which a newborn baby was killed. By 1976, the group’s commune in Powelton Village was under 24-hour police surveillance.  An eviction order was issued in August 1978, leading to a shoot-out during which a police officer James Ramp was killed.

 “Did the MOVE members shoot Ramp?” comments former Philadelphia City Councilman Angel Ortiz. “This has never been fully answered. The MOVE compound was razed without proper forensic analysis.” Nine MOVE adherents were convicted of murder in the killing of James Ramp. None was specifically identified as the shooter, and it’s not clear how nine people shared responsibility for a single fatal gunshot. 

For the next seven years, after the MOVE migrated to Osage Avenue and took control of a large abandoned house, the group continued to accumulate citations and provoke complaints from their neighbors, most of whom were middle-class blacks. 

Neighbors who could tolerate the olfactory onslaught from the group’s living area found it more difficult to endure incessant – and frequently profane --harangues broadcast by the MOVE via loudspeaker, many of which demanded the release of their imprisoned comrades. 

On May 12, 1985 – Mother’s Day – people living near the targeted building were ordered to evacuate as police made preparations for the pre-dawn attack. By the end of the following day, hundreds of local residents were homeless as a result of the bombing.

If the purpose of the exercise had been simply to evict the MOVE, the police could simply have cut off electricity and water and waited for the group to leave.

“Why don’t they just back up and relax?” asked State Senator Hardy Williams as he watched the siege unfold. “Nobody’s going anywhere.” 

 

The man with the murderous plan: Leo Brooks (center).

An approach of that kind would have solved the problem, but not inflicted punishment on a group seen by the police as a tribal enemy, and resented by the municipal government for defying its authority. 

The Philadelphia PD, which may be the most violence-prone municipal police agency in the country, wanted a measure of revenge for the death of Officer Ramp (a message inscribed on a locker room chalkboard and left there for years read “MOVE 1, PPD 0”). That sentiment was fortified when Mumia Abu-Jamal, a radical activist sentenced to death for the murder of Philadelphia PD officer Daniel Faulkner, became a prominent admirer of the group. 

Leo Brooks, the impenitent official who devised the aerial assault plan, blithely described the wholesale annihilation of an entire city block as the kind of things that happen “when citizens failed to abide by the law and respond to the police authority.” The compelling need to assert that “authority” supposedly justified the criminal actions of police officials and the indiscriminate destruction of the homes and property of people who had nothing to do with the group.  

"They won't be calling the Police Commissioner `Motherf****r' anymore," gloated one Philadelphia cop after the neighborhood had been burned down. 

Philadelphia radio host Michael Coard contends, plausibly, that the police bombing “never would have happened in the Northeast or in South Philly, even if the Hell’s Angels had kidnapped then-President Ronald Reagan. And everybody knows it…. G**dammit, even Osama’s house and neighborhood in Abbottabad weren’t firebombed.”

Thirty years later, the neighborhood bears the ineffaceable scars inscribed through this exercise in state terrorism. 

As it happened, I was in Philadelphia on the morning of May 13, 1985 as part of a college performing group. By the time we departed for our next engagement, the assault had already begun, and we heard news of a “shoot-out” shortly before our arrival in Washington, D.C. 

As we retired that evening, the local television news carried accounts of the firebombing – which commanded less attention than another debacle that took place on the same day, the introduction of the “New Coke” in an event at Lafayette Park. 

The Coca-Cola Company’s ill-advised decision to alter the formula of its toxic soft drink caused a paroxysm of national outrage on the part of a public that reacted to the Philadelphia fire-bombing with stolid indifference. Those who tampered with that product faced accountability. Jobs were lost, reputations were ruined, and corporate policies were changed. Nothing of the sort befell those responsible for a military assault on an urban neighborhood that left nearly a dozen people dead and hundreds of people homeless. 

Coca-Cola’s decision to change its recipe was national news, as was the company’s chastened decision to rescind that change. The fire-bombing of West Philly received perfunctory notice in the State-aligned media, and was quickly forgotten by a materially sated population.

As Commissioner Sambor said in his overture to the holocaust on Osage Avenue, “This is America” – or, in any case, what we’ve allowed it to become.

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Sheriff Michael Lewis: The Very Model of a Federalized Enforcer

MRAPs and "Urban Warfare" in Baltimore

“This was urban warfare, no question about it,” asserted Michael Lewis, describing his experiences during the recent Baltimore upheaval. As protests coalesced and looters began to rampage, Lewis, who is sheriff of Maryland’s Wicomico County and a sergeant in the State Police, “rallied up the troops. We made sure our MRAP was prepared and ready.”

After the “troops” arrived in Baltimore about two hours later, city police “thanked us profusely for being there, apologized to us for having to be there,” Lewis said during an interview on a local radio program. “They said we could have handled this, we were very capable of handling this, but we were told to stand down, repeatedly told to stand down” as rioters laid siege to the city.

If not for the perfidy of the Baltimore municipal government, Lewis insisted, the police could have prevented widespread property damage.  But the police “were essentially neutered from the start…. They were told to `stand down, you will not take any action, let them destroy property.’”

The sheriff insists that he heard those orders himself “over the Baltimore police radio that I had tethered to my body-armor vest. I heard it repeatedly: `Stand down, stand down, stand down! Back up, back up, retreat, retreat!’”

One important detail disclosed but not dwelt upon by Lewis is that at the time he heard those orders he and the other police were not protecting private property. They were defending the infrastructure of the coercive sector – City Hall and, particularly, Police Headquarters. 

Building his "Q rating": Lewis on TV in Baltimore.

Sheriff Lewis is one of the most self-indulgent media whores in a profession plentifully stocked with such specimens. Predictably, he has become something of a hero to the Authoritarian Right for reinforcing the narrative that Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake deliberately provided “space” for looters to “destroy” private property. 

Ms. Rawlings-Blake is a standard-issue welfare state technocrat, and like most people of that persuasion she grotesquely over-estimates the ability of government to fine-tune mass behavior. Her now–notorious lament that the policy of leaving “space” for peaceful protesters was exploited by rioters was awkwardly phrased and quite typical of people who think that events can be orchestrated by decree. Her meaning was plain to anyone not interested in deliberately misconstruing it to serve partisan interests or to validate racially tinged conspiracy theories. 

Yes, the administration of Rawlings-Blake let private property burn once the riots erupted, because that is what city governments and police departments always do in such circumstances. When large-scale violence breaks out within a tax jurisdiction, the first priority of the enforcement caste is to protect itself, those who divide the plunder, and the symbolic manifestations of their “authority.” 

This was the primary reason Sheriff Lewis rallied his “troops” for “urban warfare” and made the trip to Baltimore in his department’s federally subsidized armored assault vehicle. He acted out of tax-feeder solidarity, not in defense of property. A subsidiary purpose of that trip appears to have been using the afflicted city as a backdrop for his self-promoting media appearances.

Amid predictable claims on the Authoritarian Right that the riots reflected the devious work of well-funded “outside agitators,” Sheriff Lewis was actually playing that role, which is precisely what we should expect from someone who loots other people for a living.

Freddie Gray, the homicide victim whose death in police custody precipitated the violent convulsions in Baltimore, was a low-level narcotics offender. Michael Lewis is a nationally renowned narcotics profiteer. He was a pioneer in the form of road piracy called “civil asset forfeiture.”

 

The recently published book In Roads: A Working Solution to America’s War on Drugs features a nearly hagiographical profile of Lewis and his successful efforts to “pull in expendable cash hand over fist.” By exploiting every traffic stop as a “consensual encounter,” police trained in the methods used by Lewis can build legal pretexts for drug searches. This, in turn, can result in confiscations of cash and salable property that can be spent on “just about anything under a law enforcement agency’s roof,” exults the author, former Kane County, Illinois Deputy Roy Hain. 

Thanks to his acumen in road piracy, Lewis presides over a department enjoying a huge and recession-proof windfall from the prohibition-inflated narcotics industry. His interdiction efforts do nothing to abate drug use, and they actually help boost the profits of the criminals who have captured that market with the government’s assistance. Criminal kingpins on both ends of this arrangement live very comfortably while street-level petty offenders like Freddie Gray are killed by the retail-level gangs controlled by those elites – including the officially licensed gang called the Baltimore Police Department. 

"Imperial Mission": Lewis is a global evangelist for prohibition.

In addition to using plundered proceeds to buy expensive toys for his comrades, Lewis enjoys a lucrative part-time career as a circuit-riding evangelist for the Prohibition Plunderbund. 

Hain points out that Lewis “travels the country and the world (to include Australia, London, Germany, Russia, and the West Indies) teaching classes to police officers on these tactics and the examples of the fruits of their application. He also designed a seminar for police administrators, to share the importance and potential of this cause, as well as passing on his imperial mission: the refusal to surrender to drug traffickers and engagement of every patrol officer in the realization that drug interception is their responsibility.”

It is worth underscoring Hain’s description of Lewis’s work as an “imperial mission.” That expression is not used ironically, or disparagingly: Sheriff Lewis, who has been embraced by many self-styled constitutionalists for his supposed opposition to federalization of law enforcement, is an unabashed proponent of a globe-spanning prohibitionist empire. The seminars he conducts overseas are part of an international counter-narcotic effort that grows out of a United Nations treaty – the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

Michael Lewis, in brief, is the very model of a federalized enforcer – a preening, self-enraptured, lavishly subsidized functionary in body armor who is indifferent to civil liberties and sees himself as something of a superhero.

“I have the unique ability to distinguish between a law-abiding person and an up-to-no-good person,” Lewis casually boasted to a New York Times Magazine reporter five years into his career as a narcotics enforcer with the Maryland State Police. “I’ve got that supercharged knowledge of the Constitution that allows me to do this right.” 

“He can tell if a man’s lying, he says, by watching the pulsing of the carotid artery in his neck,” wrote Jeffrey Goldberg. “He can smell crack cocaine inside a closed automobile. He’s a human drug dog, a walking polygraph machine.”

Actually, he was a low-echelon road agent in the federal government’s war on the Bill of Rights, adept at devising pretexts to stop harmless people and in using the DEA’s index of “narcotics indicators” to build the stop into a warrantless search and, hopefully, a roadside confiscation. 

 

Nazi-era German Ordnungspolizei stop and search a car.

“The goal of Lewis’s unit, the criminal-interdiction unit, is to find drugs, guns, and untaxed cigarettes in the cars of smugglers,” explained Goldberg. “However, in order to stop a suspected gunrunner or drug mule, troopers first have to find a reason in the state’s traffic laws.” 

Once a pretext stop is arranged, the armed functionary responsible for the ambush assesses the driver and the vehicle for “indicators” – “air fresheners … loose-fitting clothing, day-old beards … food wrappers on the floor.” One informal but inescapable narcotics “indicator,” Goldberg points out, was is ethnic background of the driver. In 1999, the year the Times published that profile, Lewis’s agency was sued for profiling of the racial variety. The Maryland State Police lost that lawsuit, but through the exercise of dilatory tactics it has managed to drag out legal proceedings to this day. 

Like much of the evil done in the name of law enforcement, the profiling in which Lewis was engaged with the MSP wasn’t necessarily a product of racial animus, but a reflection of federal priorities. Lewis began his career in 1984, the same year the DEA initiated “Operation Pipeline,” through which he and countless others were recruited and trained to be federal counter-narcotics assets.

Although he claims a “super-charged understanding of the Constitution,” Lewis has never explained what provision of that document authorized the federal government to criminalize the use or sale of narcotics, or to subsidize state-level enforcement efforts. Although he is among the county sheriffs who loudly announced their intention to prevent federal gun confiscation efforts under Obama, Lewis spent decades seizing guns as part of a federalized state police task force. 

In similar fashion, Lewis’s supposed hostility toward Washington hasn’t deterred him from accepting battlefield-grade vehicles and weaponry through the Pentagon’s LESO program. The only documented instance of Lewis interposing against Washington involves federal “under-reach,” rather than over-reach. After former Attorney General Eric Holder proposed a handful of trivial and inconsequential “reforms” to civil asset forfeiture, Lewis gloatingly observed that this wouldn’t apply to road piracy operations carried out by police at the state and county levels. 

 

Yes, they did "Stop and frisk" in Nazi Germany, too.

Whatever current federal policy might be, Lewis and his comrades will continue using the tactics taught to them by the Feds. The violent cretins who pillaged businesses in downtown Baltimore embody a localized menace. As a federally licensed looter, Lewis has propagated evil nation-wide by sharing his techniques with law enforcement officers throughout the Soyuz. 

In the wake of the Baltimore riots, a familiar chorus has warned that those events, and future urban upheavals, will be exploited by the Obama administration to federalize law enforcement. Those predictions frequently cite recent statements by racial pyromaniac Al Sharpton, who has demanded a “national policy and national law on policing.”

There is little, if any, practical difference between the system Sharpton has proposed and the one under which we’re living right now. 

In the Soviet Union, the Cheka secret police inherited many of its rank-and file from the Okhrana, the imperial internal security ministry. The Soviets repurposed the Czarist police into the Militsiya, which was later folded into the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD). In either configuration the “local” police under the Soviets continued their traditional role of investigating conventional crimes.

In similar fashion, the German Kriminalpolizei existed long before the Nazis consolidated their Reich, and continued to investigate crimes against persons and property even after being absorbed into the Party-dominated State Security apparatus. 

Under either variety of totalitarianism, the “local” police continued to exist as discrete bodies, and even enjoyed a measure of independence – with the understanding that they would be required to assist the Regime’s political police organs identify and deal with subversives. 

When the KGB or Gestapo stretched out its hand to collect or chastise enemies of the state, the political police did so as part of what in our context would be called “multi-jurisdictional task forces.” Maryland’s Pro-Active Criminal Enforcement team (PACE), in which Michael Lewis played a leading role for decades, exemplifies the federalized task forces upon which every totalitarian police state depends. 

For the Punitive Right, Baltimore summoned nightmares of federalized “Obamalaw Enforcers” marching in serried rows down Main Street – as if the centralization of law enforcement began with the incumbent president, rather than being inherited and accelerated by him. 

Where federalization of law enforcement is concerned, the likes of Al Sharpton have been talking the talk – but Sheriff Michael Lewis and his ilk have been walking the jackbooted walk. 

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